CASE COMMENTARIES
ARBITRATION
Arbitration Agreements May Be Enforced Even Within Adhesion Contracts.
Chapman v. H. & R. Block Corp., No. E2005-00082-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 737 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2005).
By Holly N. Mancl
Typically, parties to an arbitration agreement are required to resolve disputes
within the agreement’s scope through arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act
evinces a federal policy of enforcing such agreements. However, a party may allege
that the terms of the arbitration agreement are so unfair that the court should either
deem the contract unconscionable or determine that a party waived his or her right
to arbitration, thus rendering the agreement unenforceable and enabling the parties
to seek relief through adjudication. The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently upheld
a motion to compel arbitration despite allegations of unconscionability and waiver
when the parties signed a stand-alone two-page arbitration agreement.
In Chapman v. H. & R. Block, Chapman entered into a loan agreement with
H. & R. Block (“Block”) on behalf of her daughter, Daniels. Chapman personally
guaranteed the loan and offered her home as security in the transaction. Chapman
agreed to give Daniels the loan disbursement, and Daniels agreed to make the
necessary payments. The loan agreement contained a stand-alone two page
arbitration agreement. The loan agreement also reserved a three-day revocability
period for the borrower. Chapman did not rescind within the grace period, but later
asked if she could be released from the contract. Block refused, and Chapman
continued to comply with the terms of the agreement. Daniels subsequently ceased
making payments on the loan.
Chapman filed suit seeking rescission of the loan and alleging that Block
“engaged in activities, which it knew or should have known were unconscionable,
false, and fraudulent and which had the purpose of causing [her] to sign [the]
mortgage loan.” Block filed a motion to compel arbitration based on the arbitration
agreement. The agreement stated that either party could compel arbitration “within
60 days after a complaint, an answer, or an amendment to a complaint has been
served.” Block filed its motion within 60 days after the amended complaint was
served. The trial court ordered arbitration, but required that Block pay all arbitration
fees.
Chapman raised two issues on appeal. The first issue was whether the
arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unreasonable. Although courts have
a policy of enforcing arbitration agreements, courts will not enforce unconscionable
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agreements with terms so unfair that enforcement would be oppressive. In adhesion
contracts, one party possesses overwhelming bargaining power and controls nearly
all terms of the contract. Even though adhesion contracts give the weaker party
virtually no bargaining power, the mere fact that a contract is one of adhesion does
not unequivocally render the agreement unconscionable. Rather, the court must
evaluate the terms of the contract to see if they were “beyond the reasonable
expectations of an ordinary consumer.” Therefore, regardless of whether the
contract was one of adhesion, it will only be void as unconscionable if the terms are
so unfair that they would shock an ordinary consumer.
The second issue presented to the appellate court was whether Block waived
its right to compel arbitration. Although motions to compel arbitration are typically
initiated after the filing of the original complaint, this agreement enabled the parties
to compel arbitration within 60 days of an amended complaint being served. Block
compelled arbitration more than seven months after the filing of the original
complaint, but within 60 days of the amended complaint being served. If the court
adopted a narrow definition of “amendment,” then Block properly moved to compel
arbitration within the designated period. However, if the court used the definition
that Chapman urged, then an amendment must include “a new set of contentions
and denials, [or] a new requirement of proof”; under this definition, Chapman’s
amendment to her complaint would not constitute an amendment under the
agreement, thus enabling her to pursue her claims in court.
The Federal Arbitration Act preempts state law and governs arbitration
agreements. This Act codifies the federal policy of enforcing arbitration agreements.
However, unconscionable agreements will not be enforced. Although adhesion
contracts are frequently offered to consumers with miniscule bargaining power over
the terms, the fact that an agreement is presented as a contract of adhesion will not
definitively render the contract unenforceable. In order for any contract, including
contracts of adhesion, to be unenforceable, the contract terms must be oppressive to
the weaker party and viewed as unreasonable by ordinary consumers. These
requirements place a heavy burden on parties seeking to avoid arbitration
agreements.
Courts utilize basic contract principles when evaluating arbitration
agreements. An assertion that a contract should be void based on a party’s failure to
read its terms is unlikely to garner sympathy from a court; enabling a party to
succeed on such a claim would directly contradict the contract principle of holding
parties to their contracts. In addition, courts enforce severability clauses when only a
portion of a contract is deemed unenforceable. Sensitive to fairness concerns, courts
evaluating mandatory arbitration agreements may choose to assign all arbitration fees
to the party that is in a better position to bear the financial burden. Thus, the
Chapman court respected the validity of the arbitration agreement and compelled
arbitration, but assigned all fees to Block.
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Even if an arbitration agreement is found to be valid, parties may waive their
rights to enforce the agreement. However, because public policy favors arbitration, a
general presumption against waiver exists. A party trying to prove waiver must show
that the adverse party knew of its arbitration rights, that it acted inconsistently, and
that its inconsistent actions prejudiced the moving party. The placement of such a
heavy burden on the moving party emphasizes that courts must resolve any doubts
concerning the scope and enforceability of waiver in favor of arbitration.
Transactional attorneys must be cognizant of the strong public policy favoring the
enforcement of arbitration agreements.
As Chapman illustrates, arbitration
agreements will be enforced unless an ordinary consumer would deem the terms
unreasonable or oppressive, or if the parties have explicitly waived their rights to
arbitration. Chapman illustrates that courts are likely to follow the federal policy of
supporting arbitration, as well as the policy of enforcing the unambiguous terms of
written contracts. Transactional attorneys should advise clients to carefully read and
review all parts of the contract and warn clients that signing an arbitration agreement
will likely result in a waiver of their right to seek judicial relief.
BANKRUPTCY
BAPCPA Homestead Cap Equally Applicable in Opt-Out States. In re Gaylord
Philip Landahl, 338 B.R. 920 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006).
By Jordan Rae Smith
When filing for bankruptcy, a debtor has the right to claim certain items of
property as exempt and, by doing so, protect those items from creditors; such
exemptions can include a vehicle or equity in a home. While these exemptions are
designed to protect debtors, limitations on these exemptions are designed to protect
creditors. In part to protect creditors from the so-called “mansion loophole,”
through which debtors in some states could protect all of their equity through home
ownership, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”).
Although BAPCPA amended the Bankruptcy Code to limit the homestead
exemptions in order to prevent consumer debtors from forum shopping, ambiguities
in the amendment’s wording made it unclear whether it applied in states where
federal exemptions were unavailable. This question came before the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, in In Re
Landahl.
In In Re Landahl, the debtor, Landahl, filed for bankruptcy relief under
Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code and claimed an exemption for his
homestead under Florida law. The Chapter 7 trustee objected to the exemption on
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the grounds that its value exceeded $125,000 and that it was a residence that the
debtor had acquired within 1,215 days of the bankruptcy petition date. The case was
subsequently converted to a Chapter 13 case, but the court found that the trustee
retained standing to continue to pursue the objection.
The debtor made two arguments in his motion for summary judgment. First,
he alleged that the equity of the homestead property was less than $125,000. Second,
he argued that the BAPCPA cap did not apply in Florida because of its status as an
“opt-out” state. The court focused on whether the application of the BAPCPA cap
was valid.
As enacted in 1978, the Bankruptcy Code offers debtors a choice to either
exempt certain property under Section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code or exempt
that property under applicable state law. The state of Florida later adopted
legislation that denied its residents the opportunity to use the federal exemptions
from the Bankruptcy Code. States with this type of legislation are referred to as
“opt-out” states.
The BAPCPA added a new subparagraph (p) to Section 522 of the
Bankruptcy Code to remove a debtor’s homestead exemption if the debtor has not
owned the homestead for at least 1,215 days before the bankruptcy petition date and
if the value of the homestead exceeds $125,000. Section 522(p) provides:
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection and
section 544 and 548, as a result of electing under subsection
(b)(3)(A) to exempt property under State or local law, a debtor may
not exempt any amount of interest that was acquired by the
debtor during the 1215-day period preceding the date of the
filing of the petition that exceeds in the aggregate $125,000 in
value. [Emphasis added.]
The court noted several prior cases in its discussion of whether the BAPCPA
cap applied in Florida; all of these cases focused on the language of Section 522(p),
specifically regarding the term “electing.” Ultimately, in determining that the
homestead value cap did, in fact, apply in opt-out states like Florida, the court noted
that the term “electing” in Section 522(p) is not connected with the term as it is used
in Section 522(b)(1), which explains the option to choose between state and federal
exemption laws. Instead, the court found that the term relates back to Section
522(b)(3)(A), which contains the provision under which state exemption laws may be
used.
The court also cited previous holdings demonstrating that Congress’ purpose
in adding Section 522(p) was primarily to close the “mansion loophole.” Thus, the
court determined that there was no reason to believe that Congress intended Section
522(p) to apply in some states and not others. Consequently, the court held that the
“electing” language can be read as referring to the act of claiming an exemption for a
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homestead property under state law. The court held that such a reading is consistent
with other provisions within the Bankruptcy Code and is consistent with the
legislative history. The court noted that “even if there is an ambiguity, the
conclusion from the legislative history is inescapable—there is no expressed intent to
make the $125,000 cap operative in some states, but not others.” The court denied
the debtor’s motion for summary judgment and sustained the trustee’s objection to
the debtor’s claim of exemption.
The court in In re Landahl supported a broad application of Section 522(p) by
holding that the cap on homestead exemptions in bankruptcy proceedings applied in
all states, not just those that allow their residents to choose between federal and state
exemption laws. The court specifically noted that it would be “irresponsible” to rule
that the amendment was inoperative in certain circumstances that are not explicitly
defined. If the court had found that the cap provision was not applicable in Florida,
then the “mansion loophole” would still be open and debtors could protect their
assets through exemptions in certain states. Although this was not the first court to
come to this conclusion, its holding supports the applicability of the BAPCPA cap,
even in opt-out states, and protects the interest of creditors by preventing debtors
from shielding extensive assets through exemptions.
___________________
Economic Substance Determines Whether a Transaction is a True Lease or a
Secured Transaction. United Airlines, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 416 F.3d 609
(7th Cir. 2005).
By Whitney Bailey
Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code uses substance rather than form to
distinguish between a lease and a security interest. Thus, only a “true lease” qualifies
as a lease under the Code. Because leases and secured loans may be structured to
serve similar economic purposes, it is possible to draft leases that work like security
agreements and secured loans that work like leases. The distinction becomes
important when the lessee-debtor is in bankruptcy, as the Bankruptcy Code imposes
different rights and responsibilities on the parties depending on whether the
transaction is characterized as a lease or a secured loan. A true lessee must perform
its obligations under the lease or forfeit the property. A borrower who has granted a
security interest, however, can keep the property without paying the full, agreed
upon price; the borrower must give the lender the economic value of the security
interest with the difference becoming an unsecured claim. This situation was
presented to the Seventh Circuit in United Airlines, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.
During the 1990s, United Airlines (“United”) entered into various
transactions to finance a series of improvements to its facilities at four airports. One
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such transaction was between United and the California Statewide Communities
Development Authority (“CSCDA”) in which CSCDA issued $155 million in bonds
to fund improvements at United’s facilities at San Francisco International Airport
(“Airport”). United had leased 128 acres for use as a maintenance base, since 1973;
the lease was to terminate in 2013 unless an extension was negotiated. The rent
depended on an independent estimation of the property’s market value. The 1997
transaction between United and CSCDA involved four aspects: the sublease, the
leaseback, the trust indenture, and the guaranty.
First, United subleased twenty of its 128 acres at the Airport to CSCDA for
thirty-six years. This term of the sublease matched the debt-repayment schedule
instead of the remaining term of United’s lease with the Airport. CSCDA paid $1 to
sublet the twenty acres. Second, CSCDA leased the twenty acres back to United for
a rent equal to the interest on the bonds plus an administrative fee payable to the
trustee, HSBC Bank (“HSBC”). The lease had a $155 million balloon payment in
2033 to retire the principal. United could postpone the payment until 2038; if that
occurred, the sublease would also be extended. United had the option to prepay, in
which case the sublease and the leaseback terminated. If United failed to pay,
CSCDA could evict United from the twenty acres. The lease also contained a “hell
or high water” clause, meaning that United must pay the promised rent even if some
physical or legal event dispossesses United of the use or economic benefit of the
premises. Third, CSCDA issued the bonds and released the $155 million to United
against the promises made in the sublease and arranged for HSBC, as trustee, to
receive the payments. Finally, United provided a guaranty to ensure repayment of
the bonds.
After filing for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,
United argued that none of the four transactions constituted a lease for purposes of
Section 365. United proposed to treat each transaction as a secured loan, enabling
the company to continue using the airport facilities while paying only a fraction of
the promised “rent.” The bankruptcy court ruled that one of the transactions—but
not the San Francisco transaction—was a true lease, but the others were not. The
district court reversed in part, deciding that all four arrangements were true leases.
United appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit ruled that substance, rather than form, determines the
nature of the transaction and distinguishes a lease from a secured loan. Only a true
lease qualifies as a lease under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. In reaching its
decision, the Court of Appeals examined the functional meaning of the Bankruptcy
Code, the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), and the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code.
Reflecting a practical approach to interpretation of Section 365, the Court
concluded that it was unlikely that the Bankruptcy Code would make substantial
economic effects turn on the parties’ choice of language rather than the substance of
their transaction. If the Code allowed form to control, then the distinctions between
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the two types of transactions could be “obliterated” at the drafters’ will. While the
Code does not expressly define the term “lease,” the UCC and the legislative history
demonstrate that whether a lease is a true lease or a lease intended as security
depends on the circumstances of each case.
After determining that substance rules over form in distinguishing between a
lease and a secured loan, the Court then addressed which law should be used to
determine the legal consequences of the particular transactions. The Court turned to
California state law, as the Bankruptcy Code is silent on the issue. California had
enacted the UCC, and therefore uses a functional approach to separating leases from
secured credit with respect to personal property and also takes a similar approach to
real property as a matter of common law.
The Court held that the transaction between United and the CSCDA was not
a true lease under California law. First, the rent in question was measured not by the
market rental value of the twenty acres, but by the debt-repayment schedule for the
bonds. The “hell or high water” clause further illustrated the lack of connection
between the base’s rental value and United’s financial obligation. Second, CSCDA
had no remaining interest at the end of the lease. United retained its full tenancy.
Reversion without additional payment is the UCC’s per se rule for identifying
secured credit. Third, the balloon payment had no parallel in a true lease, though it is
a common feature of secured credit. Finally, the lease and sublease terminated
immediately upon prepayment by United. In a true lease, prepayment would
ordinarily secure a tenant’s right to occupy the property.
The holding of United Airlines does not reflect a divergence from the
approach commonly used to separate leases from secured transactions. It does,
however, reflect the ever-increasing complexity of lease, security, and financing
transactions. In structuring these transactions, a transactional attorney should be
aware that if a lease is later held to be a security interest, the secured party could be
denied secured creditor status if the appropriate steps are not taken to perfect the
security interest.
Moreover, United Airlines demonstrates, particularly in the
bankruptcy context, the importance of determining, during the planning and drafting
of the transaction, whether a bankruptcy court will likely classify the transaction as a
true lease or as a secured transaction.
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COMMERCIAL LAW
Actual Loss Must be Proven in a Successful Tennessee Consumer Protection
Act Claim.
Roberson v. West Nashville Diesel, Inc., No. M2004-01825-COA-R3-CV, 2006 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2006).
By Rachel N. Wright
When a repair shop does work on equipment and the owner neither pays for
the work nor tries to pick up the equipment for an extended period of time, is the
repair shop entitled to storage fees? If a repair shop is not entitled to such fees, is it
a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) to demand such
fees? These are some of the major questions addressed by the Tennessee Court of
Appeals in Roberson v. West Nashville Diesel, Inc.
In Roberson v. West Nashville Diesel, Inc., Mr. Roberson took his equipment,
including three trucks and a Cat Loader, to West Nashville Diesel (“WND”) for
repair. Mr. Roberson partially paid his debt for the repair work by performing
grading work for WND. However, Mr. Roberson still owed WND a balance of
$14,706 after completing the grading work. For approximately the next two years,
WND periodically billed Mr. Roberson for the balance owed on the repair work.
Mr. Roberson made no attempt to pay the bill, nor did he attempt to pick up his
equipment during that time.
After receiving no response from Mr. Roberson regarding payment or pickup
of the equipment, WND sent a letter to Mr. Roberson on May 28, 2002, stating that
he owed storage fees of $10 per day per vehicle, totaling more than $30,000, in
addition to the balance still owed for repairs. WND also informed Mr. Roberson
that he had until June 10, 2002, to pay the repair bill as well as the storage charges or
it would sell all of the equipment at auction on June 27, 2002. On the day the
auction was scheduled to take place, WND received a certified letter from Mr.
Roberson indicating that he was aware of the upcoming auction and notifying WND
that he had filed a warrant to recover the property. The property was sold at auction
on the scheduled date. The three trucks were sold to WND for the price owed for
the repair work. The Cat Loader had a repair work balance of $7,141 and was sold
to a third party for $8,500.
Mr. Roberson then filed to recover the vehicles in General Sessions Court.
The General Sessions Court ordered WND to return the equipment to Mr.
Roberson, and WND then appealed to the Circuit Court (“trial court”). In the trial
court, Mr. Roberson alleged that WND was not entitled to storage fees and that the
attempt to collect them violated the TCPA. The trial court found that the $14,706
for repairs on the equipment was a reasonable sum. The trial court also awarded
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compensatory damages of $12,000 to Mr. Roberson, which it determined was the
difference between the fair market value of the equipment and the amount for which
it was sold.
The trial court found that no authority, statutory or otherwise, allowed WND
to charge storage fees and that WND's attempt to collect storage fees constituted an
unfair and deceptive act in violation of the TCPA. For violating the TCPA, the trial
court awarded Mr. Roberson $3,000 in damages and $6,000 in attorney's fees. WND
appealed the trial court's decision to the Tennessee Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals examined three main issues: the
repair costs, the storage fees, and the alleged violation of the TCPA. First, the court
emphasized that the propriety of having an auction to pay Mr. Roberson's debt was
not challenged. It also stated that Mr. Roberson was to be awarded any of the
proceeds of the sale after the balance for repairs was satisfied. However, the court
found that the fair market value of the equipment should be determined by its sale
price at the auction. The court found that the three trucks were sold at their fair
market price, which, in this case, was also the amount that was owed in repairs. The
only piece of equipment with excess sales proceeds was the Cat Loader. The
difference in the fair market value and the sale price for the Cat Loader was
approximately $1,359. The court found that the trial court erred in awarding Mr.
Roberson $12,000 for the loss of his property because the only difference between
fair market value and the equipment’s sale price was the $1,359 for the Cat Loader.
Thus, the court determined that the trial court erred in its calculations and reduced
the amount to $1,359.
Next, the court considered whether storage fees were appropriate in this
case. WND argued that it had the right to charge the storage fees relying on a
“common law storage lien.” However, the court held that “whether or not any
general common law lien for storage costs may have survived the enactment of
specific statutory liens, any entitlement to such a lien rests on an actual obligation to
pay the storage costs.” The court agreed with the trial court's finding that there was
no evidence indicating any type of agreement between the parties with regard to
storage fees. In addition, the court noted that WND never gave Mr. Roberson
notice that it intended to charge storage fees, nor did WND include storage fees
when it periodically billed Mr. Roberson for the balance owed on repairs. For these
reasons, the court held that storage fees were inappropriate in this case.
Finally, the court considered whether WND violated the TCPA when it
attempted to charge Mr. Roberson storage fees with no prior notice, and also
whether Mr. Roberson was entitled to the damages and attorney's fees he had been
awarded. The trial court had found that the attempt to charge the storage fees
constituted an unfair and deceptive act under the TCPA. The appellate court,
however, held that it did not matter whether a TCPA violation had occurred because
Mr. Roberson was not entitled to damages under the TCPA in any case. The court
observed that Mr. Roberson did not demonstrate that he had suffered any
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“ascertainable loss of money or property” as a result of the alleged unfair or
deceptive act. In fact, Mr. Roberson’s loss of money or property occurred because
he failed to pay his repair bill for an extended period of time, entitling WND to
perform the auction. Consequently, the court reversed the $3,000 award to Mr.
Roberson for the TCPA violation and also the $6,000 award for payment of
attorney's fees.
Roberson v. West Nashville, Inc. demonstrates that for a claim to be successful
under the TCPA, there must first be evidence that there has been an actual loss of
either property or money. The transactional attorney should remember, when
advising clients in a proposed course of action in a contract or lien situation, that a
TCPA violation claim may be successful if the other party to the contract can
demonstrate actual loss and an unfair or deceptive act. Therefore, before a
transaction is commenced, a transactional attorney should caution his or her client to
unambiguously provide for additional remedies (fees, charges, etc.) in the contract to
avoid potential TCPA claims.
CONTRACT LAW
“At Will” the De Facto Standard for Oral Agreements of Indefinite Duration.
Sun-Drop Bottling Co. v. Herb Helton, No. M2004-02152-COA-R3-CV, 2006 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2006).
By Rachel O. Park
Unless the parties’ intentions indicate otherwise, contracts for an indefinite
duration are generally terminable “at will” by either party. With regard to oral
contracts for an indefinite duration, the best evidence of the parties’ intentions is the
conduct of the parties themselves. In addition to the parties’ conduct, the court may
also consider a number of other factors, including: (1) the position of the parties and
the circumstances surrounding the transaction at the time it was made; (2) the
business to which the contract relates; and (3) the subject matter of the contract.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals considered these factors in Sun-Drop Bottling Co. v.
Herb Helton and determined that the contract in question was terminable “at will.”
The relationship between Herb Helton (“Helton”) and the Sun-Drop
Bottling Company (“Sun-Drop”) began in 1955 when the parties entered into an oral
distribution agreement. This initial agreement was terminated in 1960. However, in
1967 the parties entered into a second oral distribution agreement. Under this
agreement, Helton purchased the distribution rights of Sun-Drop products for the
distribution area of Lewis County. Most recently, in July 1996, Helton and SunDrop entered into a written distribution agreement covering the distribution of all
Sun-Drop products.
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At some point after the parties signed the 1996 agreement, Helton desired to
sell his distribution rights to a third party. Not wanting to allow Helton to sell his
distribution interest, Sun-Drop immediately filed a declaratory judgment action
seeking a declaration of the respective rights of the company and Helton under the
parties’ oral and written distribution agreements. Following an evidentiary hearing,
the trial court concluded that the contract between Helton and Sun-Drop was “at
will.” Therefore, either party had the right to terminate the contract without cause
upon reasonable notice if the termination was in good faith.
Helton appealed the trial court’s decision. On appeal, Helton provided three
examples to support his contention that the contract was not terminable “at will.”
Helton’s first example involved two occasions where Sun-Drop merely altered the
terms of a distribution agreement without terminating the rights of Helton as a
distributor. From this example, Helton argued that if Sun-Drop had the right to
terminate its distribution agreements “at will,” Sun-Drop would have simply
terminated Helton’s distribution rights instead of facilitating a compromise
agreement between Helton and another distributor. Both the trial and appellate
courts concluded that Sun-Drop was motivated by maintaining goodwill with its
distributors and protecting its reputation, which could be helpful in the recruitment
of distributors in the future. Without more evidence to contradict the trial court’s
findings, the appellate court concluded that Sun-Drop’s conduct in facilitating these
two transfers did not necessarily foreclose an ability to terminate the agreements “at
will.”
Helton next argued that Sun-Drop’s past threats to terminate the 1967
agreement, all of which stated a cause for termination, established a precedent that
the agreement was not terminable “at will.” The appellate court, however,
concluded that Helton’s own actions demonstrated that the 1967 agreement was “at
will.” The court determined that Helton’s purported conduct of not maintaining
income statements, a business bank account, balance sheets, profit and loss
statements, or any other business records, coupled with the fact that he never
established a business location, was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion
that Helton was operating under a non-permanent business relationship. The court
further determined that Helton had known of Sun-Drop’s policy of treating its
contracts as “at will” as early as 1982.
Helton’s final argument was that Marshall County Distrib. Co. v. Sun-Drop
Bottling Co., Nos. 86-170-II, 86-357-II, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2710 (Tenn. Ct.
App. May 27, 1987), binds the parties in a permanent contractual agreement. In
Marshall County, the Marshall County Distribution Company sued to enjoin SunDrop from terminating an oral distribution agreement. The trial court held that the
agreement could only be terminated for cause and that cause did not exist. Id. at *2.
The distinction between the facts in Helton and that of Marshall County, however, is
that in the latter, evidence established that Sun-Drop’s management had assured
Marshall’s ownership that “there was no danger of losing the distributorship.” Id.
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Based on this distinguishing fact, the appellate court determined that the holding in
Marshall County was not applicable. Because all the evidence presented by Helton did
not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the distribution agreement was
terminable “at will,” the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision.
As Helton illustrates, the burden of proof necessary to demonstrate that an
oral agreement with an indefinite duration is not terminable “at will” is extremely
high. A party seeking to overcome such burden must establish that the parties to the
oral contract intended the contract to be something other than “at will.” Even
though the Helton court concluded that the contract was “at will,” the case provides
examples of the evidence necessary to carry the burden of proving that a contract,
oral or otherwise, is not “at will.” However, where the parties to a contract fail to
provide that the contract is terminable only for cause and fail to act in any manner
that would indicate that a contract is anything other that “at will,” courts will not
hold otherwise.
___________________
Equitable Relief Remains Unavailable for Contracts Implied in Fact. Metro.
Gov’t of Nashville v. Cigna Healthcare of Tenn., Inc., No. M2003-02700-COA-R3-CV,
2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 732 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2005).
By Brett T. Smith
When a contract implied in fact exists, equitable relief is not available.
Tennessee has long recognized that contracts implied in law and implied in fact are
two distinct types of contracts, and equitable relief is only available for contracts
implied in law. Additionally, if a party seeks damages because of a breach of
contract, actual damages must exist. The injured party may not profit from a breach
or be placed in a better position than he would be in had the contract been
completed. These two issues were central to the decision in Metropolitan Government v.
Cigna Healthcare, Inc.
In Metropolitan, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville (“Metro”) issued
a “Request for Proposal to Provide Medical and Dental Services” (“RFP”) in 1995.
Cigna submitted its proposal and secured the four-year contract in the same year.
The two pertinent provisions of the RFP were as follows: first, the successful bidder
must execute a performance bond, and second, the successful bidder must introduce
any objections to provisions of the RFP upon submission of the bid. Cigna failed to
execute a performance bond and did not introduce any objections upon submission
of the bid.
Metro first encountered problems in 1998 when it discovered that it did not
have a written contract with Cigna. While there was no written contract, Cigna had
provided insurance coverage to Metro employees since Cigna was awarded the
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contract in 1995. After doing further research, Metro discovered that Cigna had not
executed a performance bond. Metro asked Cigna to purchase the performance
bond even though the term of the contract was nearing expiration. Metro filed suit
when Cigna declined to purchase the performance bond. Metro claimed that Cigna
was unjustly enriched by accepting full payments and not executing a performance
bond. In addition, Metro claimed that if an implied contract existed, Cigna breached
the implied contract by not executing the performance bond.
Cigna moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted its motion.
The trial court found that Metro had not paid a premium for the performance bond,
and Cigna had not received extra benefits for failing to execute the performance
bond. Cigna demonstrated that the cost of the performance bond was not part of
the bid and its cost would not have been passed along to Metro. Additionally, the
trial court found a condition precedent excusing Cigna’s duty to supply a
performance bond. The value of the performance bond was to be for the
“negotiated value of the contract” per the RFP. Both parties agreed that a
“negotiated value of the contract” did not exist; therefore, Cigna’s duty to supply a
performance bond was excused. Metro appealed the ruling.
The first issue the Tennessee Court of Appeals was required to resolve was
whether Metro could recover under the theory of unjust enrichment. For a party to
recover using the equitable theory of unjust enrichment, a true contract between the
parties cannot exist, or the contract must have become unenforceable or invalid
since the formation. Many often make the mistake of assuming that equitable relief
is available for all implied contracts. However, Tennessee recognizes both implied in
law and implied in fact contracts as distinct types of implied contracts. Implied in
law contracts “are a class of obligations which are imposed or created by law without
the assent of the party bound, on the ground that they are dictated by reason and
justice.” Implied in fact contracts “arise under circumstances which, according to
the ordinary course of dealing and common understanding of men, show a mutual
intention to contract.” Parties can only recover using equitable relief if an implied in
law contract exists. In Metropolitan, Cigna and Metro performed their respective
duties under the contract for over three years as if a fully executed agreement existed.
The Court concluded that both parties’ actions showed a mutual intention to
contract and that a contract implied in fact existed. Thus, Metro could not recover
damages under the equitable theory of unjust enrichment.
The second issue the Court had to resolve was whether Metro was entitled to
damages because of Cigna’s breach of the contract. When the parties acted as if a
contract existed for three years, they entered into a fully enforceable contract implied
in fact. With a contract in place, Cigna should have executed a performance bond.
Cigna’s failure to procure the bond was a breach of contract. Under contract law,
the goal of assessing damages is to put the injured party in as close a position as
possible to the place the party would have been if the contract were completed. A
mere breach of the contract does not entitle the injured party to damages; the injured
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party must have suffered actual damages because of the breach. In Metropolitan,
Cigna fully performed all of its duties under the contract except executing a
performance bond. Metro would have been in the same position if Cigna had
executed the performance bond at the commencement of the deal. While Cigna
breached the contract, Metro did not suffer any damages because of the breach and
was not entitled to recover damages.
Metropolitan provides several reminders for transactional attorneys. First, it is
important to make certain that all necessary parties have executed and endorsed,
where appropriate, an agreement. Having a fully executed, enforceable contract is
better than having to rely on relief available for implied contracts. Second, contracts
implied in fact and implied in law are two distinct types of implied contracts.
Implied in law contracts are imposed when a party has not assented to a contract,
but equity must be done to avoid an injustice. Implied in fact contracts exist when
both parties act as if a contract exists, but an actual agreement has not been
executed. Equitable relief is only available when the court imposes a contract
implied in law. Finally, a party is not entitled to damages simply because a breach of
contract occurred. The injured party must suffer damages because of the breach. A
party is not entitled to profit from the breach or be placed in a better position than
they would have been in had the contract been performed.
___________________
Inoperative or Inaccurate? It Makes a Difference. Edward H. Tenison v. The Penn
Warranty Corp., No. M2004-02605-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 3132356 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Nov. 22, 2005).
By John L. Fuller
Imprecise contract language often leads to unintended results. Whether a
litigant wins or loses can hinge on the subtle connotations of a single adjective. This
is precisely what The Penn Warranty Corporation (“Penn”) discovered in Tenison v.
The Penn Warranty Corporation. Penn is a warranty company specializing in automobile
service contracts. Seeking to fill a niche in the market for automobile warranty
service, Penn sells its warranty coverage through used car dealerships and directly to
consumers. Penn takes pride in its simple, easy to understand, and no-hassle
coverage, but on one occasion its standard terms and conditions fell short—at least
as far as Penn was concerned.
In April 2003, Edward Tenison purchased a 1983 Mercedes-Benz 240D from
a used car dealership. Though twenty-years-old, the car’s odometer registered only
71,350 miles. Unknown to Mr. Tenison, the car had actually traveled much closer to
250,000 miles. Apparently a third-party had tampered with the odometer, rolling it
back prior to its arrival at the dealership. Along with the car, Mr. Tenison purchased
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a warranty issued by Penn through the dealership. The dealer notified Penn of the
car’s age before issuing the warranty. Penn did not object, but allowed the dealership
to issue the warranty contract on Penn’s behalf. It is unclear whether Penn inquired
about the mileage of the car at that time.
The warranty contained language that rendered void any contract for
coverage on a car with an “inoperative odometer.” The particular application of this
clause would become central to the litigation that would follow. Within the warranty
period, the car required extensive repairs totaling $9,552.18. Penn discovered the
tampered odometer during the warranty company’s review of the repairs and
subsequently denied coverage. Penn took the position that Mr. Tenison’s rolledback odometer was “inoperative,” excluding the car from warranty coverage.
Though the odometer was not correct, there was nothing “inoperative” about its
ability to measure mileage. As a result, Mr. Tenison believed that Penn could not
deny coverage under the terms of the warranty contract. The General Sessions
Court agreed.
Following a General Sessions Court decision in favor of Mr. Tenison, Penn
appealed the decision to Circuit Court. The Circuit Court found that Mr. Tenison
was not aware that the odometer had been rolled back and had made no
misrepresentations to Penn about its condition. Further the court held that while an
“inoperative odometer” would indeed void coverage under the warranty, an
odometer that was simply inaccurate would not. The Circuit Court then awarded
Mr. Tenison $9,522.18 for the cost of his repairs and $3,700 in attorney’s fees under
the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act.
On appeal to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, Penn raised three arguments.
First, that the term “inoperative odometer” did in fact exclude coverage for Mr.
Tenison’s car; second, that the exclusion language was ambiguous, making the
contract void; and finally, that the exclusion language was “so ambiguous” as to
prevent a meeting of the minds and therefore render the contract void. Following a
de novo review, the Court of Appeals rejected Penn’s arguments and unanimously
affirmed the Circuit Court.
The Court of Appeals determined that the contract language was not
ambiguous when it referred to an “inoperative odometer.” Rather, the phrase was
clear and excluded coverage from automobiles whose odometers were not working.
Because both parties acknowledged that the odometer in question was working, the
Court of Appeals held that the warranty contract was not void and that the Circuit
Court correctly awarded Mr. Tenison his repair costs.
A number of lessons can be learned from Tenison v. The Penn Warranty
Corporation. Primarily, to ensure that a contract means what it says, an insurer should
make sure the contract says what it means. The Court of Appeals suggested
explicitly that had Penn intended to exclude from warranty coverage automobiles
with incorrect odometers, the warranty company could have easily inserted language
to that effect in its contract. In essence, Penn failed to shift the burden of
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determining an automobile’s accurate history to the purchaser of the warranty.
Though the facts of Tenison are rather simple, its lesson can be quite broad. The
insertion of just a few words into its terms and conditions could have saved Penn
thousands of dollars in litigation costs.
A second lesson to emerge from Tenison suggests that warrantors who allow
third parties to enter into contracts as agents on behalf of the warrantor should
install safeguards that shift the burden of inaccurate representation to the agent.
While extensive due diligence can be cost-prohibitive for some insurers, especially
those in the “low-cost” market like Penn, threshold safeguards should be easy to
enforce. Contract language that holds an agent liable for inaccurate representation
and specifies damages will encourage the agent to discover fraudulent product
histories. It will also discourage the agent from issuing warranties for products with
suspicious histories or indicia of unlawful tampering. The facts in Tenison suggest
that the dealer could have reasonably discovered that the odometer had been rolled
back. Additionally, a simple matrix of make, model, year, and mileage could have
raised a flag on Mr. Tenison’s car suggesting that perhaps the odometer had been
manipulated.
While accurate contract language clearly protects the warrantor, it also
protects the consumer by helping him or her avoid needless litigation. The
automobile purchaser, for whom the availability of warranty service may influence
his or her decision, will purchase more reliable automobiles when warrantors predict
claim probability more accurately. A warrantor will issue warranties on more
favorable terms for automobiles less likely to need extensive service in the future.
The more favorable the warranty, the more likely a consumer is to purchase. Both
parties benefit.
In conclusion, Tenison provides all contract attorneys with an important
reminder to pay close attention to the language of the contracts he or she drafts. A
contract drafter should never rely on a court to give implied meaning to terms, nor
to enforce an adjective to the extent of its connotations. An odometer may be
inaccurate, but as long as it still counts miles, it is not inoperative.
___________________
Intent to be Bound by a Contract Will Activate an Arbitration Agreement.
God’s Battalion of Prayer Pentecostal Church, Inc. v. Miele Assocs., L.L.P., 845 N.E.2d 1265
(N.Y. 2006).
By David Goodman
Under the objective theory of contracts, an enforceable agreement requires a
manifestation of a willingness to enter into a bargain by one party and the acceptance
of that offer by another party. The execution of a contract generally satisfies these
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requirements, but other arrangements can also constitute an objective offer and
acceptance. Although contract law provides flexibility in allowing parties to enter
into binding agreements, courts are increasingly reluctant to enforce arbitration
clauses without explicit proof of acceptance. The case of God’s Battalion of Prayer
Pentecostal Church, Inc. v. Miele Associates, LLP arose in the tension between these
competing interests.
In God’s Battalion, God’s Battalion of Prayer Pentecostal Church ( “Church”)
hired Miele Associates (“Miele)” to renovate and expand its premises. Miele in turn
hired Ropal Construction (“Ropal”). Subsequently, the Church and Ropal entered
into a signed agreement. Miele also prepared and forwarded a contractual
instrument to the Church, where it remained unsigned by both parties. The
agreement provided that “all claims . . . shall be decided by arbitration.” In addition
to this unsigned written instrument, the Church asserted that an additional,
overriding oral agreement existed between the parties.
When the Church became dissatisfied with Ropal’s performance, it sued
Miele for breach of contract alleging that Miele “failed to perform the terms,
covenants and conditions of the agreement.” However, the Church maintained that
some of the contractual terms of the written agreement were included in the oral
agreement. As such, the lower court faced the question of whether an arbitration
clause is enforceable where the contractual instrument remained unsigned by both
parties and where a parallel oral agreement existed. The court sent the Church’s
claim to arbitration. Both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
On one hand, a party seeking to enforce an arbitration clause must show a
“clear, explicit and unequivocal” agreement to arbitration by the second party.
Otherwise, the second party may instead bring its claims to trial. On the other hand,
no requirement exists that a writing must be signed in order for it to be legally
binding and enforceable.
In this case, despite the fact that neither party signed the contract, the
Church evidently meant to be bound by it. First, the Church failed to refute Miele’s
claim that the parties operated under the written terms. Second, the Church’s
complaint explicitly stated that Miele failed to honor those written terms. Thus, the
Church relied upon the validity of the underlying contract while it simultaneously
sought to avoid the operation of the arbitration clause. Third, the Church did not
claim that the arbitration clause would remain unenforceable upon the execution of
the contract.
In light of these facts, the court found that both parties had objectively relied
on the written instrument, thus giving it legally binding effect. Furthermore, a
contract “should be read to give effect to all its provisions” rather than “disclaiming
part . . . while alleging breach of the rest.” The court affirmed the lower court’s
decision to send the Church’s claims against Miele to arbitration. It held that parties
seeking to enforce arbitration clauses must show “clear, explicit and unequivocal”
agreement by the other party. Yet, where evidence shows that parties intended to be
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bound by an overarching written agreement, the subordinate arbitration clause will
be enforced without a signature.
However, the court did not resolve what amount of evidence would be
insufficient to establish such intent. An attorney seeking to enforce an agreement
without invoking an arbitration clause should emphasize that the controlling
agreement was oral and show why the parties did not operate under the terms of the
written instrument. Moreover, the complaint should frame the issue solely in terms
of the oral agreement. However, from a transactional attorney’s perspective, if a
client wants to ensure that an arbitration clause will be enforced, it is important to
ensure contracts are signed by all parties in a timely fashion. A transactional attorney
should also review applicable state and federal law and consider the circumstances
under which an arbitration agreement may be invalid even within a signed
contractual instrument.
___________________
When is a Deal Finally a Deal? Barnes & Robinson Co. v. OneSource Facility Serv., Inc.,
195 S.W.3d 637 (Tenn. 2006).
By T. William Caldwell
When parties begin negotiations in furtherance of a final agreement, their
intent determines the existence of a contract, the terms of the contract, and the
extent to which each party has a duty to perform his or her contractual obligations.
Reaching an agreement can be a burdensome process, and oftentimes parties execute
letters of intent before signing a contract to memorialize benchmarks in the
agreement process. The language used in these letters represents the intent of the
parties, and courts use this language to determine the nature of the negotiations and
the success or failure of the negotiations in creating a contract.
In the early stage of negotiations for the purchase of janitorial assets from
the defendant, the plaintiff in Barnes & Robinson Co. v. OneSource executed two letters
of intent with the understanding that the letters established the framework for
contract negotiations. Both letters unambiguously referred to the execution of a
final purchase agreement as a requirement for an agreement between the parties.
Barnes & Robinson claimed that after the parties signed both letters they continued
negotiations and eventually reached an agreement. However, before a definitive
written agreement could be signed by both parties, OneSource requested, among
other things, a purchase price more than a million dollars higher than the price
named in the letters of intent. Barnes & Robinson rejected this request and
negotiations began to dissolve. Eventually, Barnes & Robinson sued OneSource for
breach of contract, failure to negotiate in good faith, and promissory estoppel.
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The trial court granted OneSource’s motion to dismiss all three claims based
solely on the intent of the parties as expressed in the language of the two executed
letters. After interpreting the letters by the ordinary and natural meaning of the
language used, the court made two conclusions that proved fatal to the plaintiff’s
claims: the letters unambiguously conditioned a final agreement between the parties
upon the execution of a definitive, written agreement, and the letters did not contain
an express agreement to negotiate in good faith. Thus, the parties never created a
contract because they did not sign a definitive, written agreement. In addition, the
unambiguous language in the letters vitiated plaintiff’s claim of promissory estoppel
on the grounds that plaintiff’s reliance was unreasonable. Finally, OneSource did not
have a duty to negotiate in good faith because Tennessee does not recognize a duty
to negotiate in good faith absent an express agreement.
On appeal, Barnes & Robinson asserted that the execution of a written
agreement was not a condition precedent to the creation of an enforceable contract.
However, the Court of Appeals noted that the letters of intent explicitly stated that
no final agreement could be created without a written, definitive agreement between
both parties. This language, by its ordinary and natural meaning, excluded the
possibility that either the letters of intent or an oral agreement could create an
enforceable contract. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Chancery Court’s
dismissal of the plaintiff’s breach of the contract claim.
Barnes & Robinson also disputed the trial court’s finding that the executed
letters of intent did not imply a duty to negotiate in good faith. Noting that
Tennessee courts do not recognize an implied duty to negotiate in good faith, the
Court of Appeals held that a duty to negotiate in good faith is dependent on an
express contractual agreement of such a duty and an express agreement on all the
essential terms of the contract. If the parties have agreed to the essential terms of a
contract, they can rightfully include an express agreement to negotiate the remaining
terms of the contract in good faith. If the parties have not already agreed on the
essential terms of the contract, any express agreement to negotiate in good faith
would be akin to an agreement to make a contract.
In Barnes & Robinson Co. v. OneSource, the parties neither agreed on the
essential terms of the contract nor did they agree to any express duty to negotiate in
good faith. The letters of intent indicated that a final agreement depended on a
definitive purchase agreement that was never signed by the parties. Also, the letters
of intent did not contain language expressly creating a duty to negotiate in good
faith. In fact, the letters of intent indicated that “the parties shall have no liability in
the event the transaction [is] not completed for any reason whatsoever.” Thus, the
defendants’ exorbitant increase in purchase price to avoid making a contract did not
subject them to liability for the failure of negotiations.
Also at issue was whether plaintiff’s actions in reliance on defendants’ alleged
representations constituted promissory estoppel. Detrimental reliance by a party is
an important component of promissory estoppel, but equally important is whether
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the reliance by the party claiming promissory estoppel is reasonable. Though on
appeal the court did not dispute plaintiff’s factual allegations regarding defendants’
representations, the court held that plaintiff’s reliance was not reasonable as a matter
of law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision; because the letters
of intent relieved the parties of liability in the event the transaction was not
completed, plaintiff’s reliance was not reasonable.
Where parties have begun contract negotiations with letters of intent or
similar instruments, courts can use those representations to settle contract disputes.
However, parties entering negotiations should consider the steps leading to a
contract as carefully as the contract itself, and they should not rely on legal safety
nets like promissory estoppel or implied duties of good faith. Therefore, a
transactional attorney, when drafting a letter of intent that includes all of the essential
terms of the proposed contract, should provide for an express agreement to
negotiate in good faith if his client wants to ensure that those essential terms will
become part of the final contract. Moreover, if the attorney foresees that it may be
necessary to rely upon the terms of the letter of intent, such letter should not require
a definitive, signed agreement as a condition precedent to formation of a contract
between the parties.
ENTERTAINMENT
Transfer of Tangible Property Does Not Necessarily Mean That Intangible
Rights Follow. Polygram Records, Inc. v. Legacy Entm’t Group, L.L.C., No. M200302608-COA-R3-CV, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2006).
By Kristy L. Rice
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a distinction between
tangible and intangible property rights. Although a person obtains tangible rights in
property, the intangible rights associated with that property do not necessarily
follow. These ownership concerns become more complicated when recording artists
contract with multiple parties to provide different services and several years pass
before ownership of the intangible rights is questioned. The Tennessee Court of
Appeals in Polygram Records, Inc. v. Legacy Entertainment Group, LLC considered the
transfer of tangible property rights and its effect on the underlying intangible
property rights.
Under the facts in Polygram, legendary performer Hank Williams entered into
a contract with MGM “for the purpose of making phonograph records.” MGM’s
rights passed to its successor in interest, Polygram Records, Inc. (“Polygram”).
Williams also entered into an agreement with WSM radio whereby he and his band,
The Drifting Cowboys, performed on the station’s “Mother’s Best Flour” radio
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program. Because Williams and his band traveled to give performances, they made
acetate recordings that could be used on the program in their absence. The
ownership of these recordings is now in dispute.
Nearly ten years after Williams’ band made the acetate recordings, WSM
decided to discard them. A station employee, Les Leverett, obtained permission to
keep the recordings for himself. After an extended period of time, Leverett sold the
recordings to a former member of The Drifting Cowboys, Hillous Butrum. Butrum
enhanced the recordings by removing skips and excess noise and adding background
music. Butrum filed and received copyrights for the re-mixed recordings, which he
then sold to Legacy Entertainment Group (“Legacy”). Legacy expressed its desire to
exploit the acetate recordings of the “Mother’s Best Flour” program through the
production and sale of phonograph records. Polygram insisted that it had exclusive
rights to exploit Williams’ recordings and brought this action to settle the dispute.
Hank Williams’ heirs joined the lawsuit claiming they inherited Williams’ rights in the
recordings. The trial court dismissed the claims of both Legacy and Polygram and
concluded that the rights to the recordings belonged to Williams’ heirs. Legacy and
Polygram appealed.
The court addressed two issues on appeal. The first was whether the trial
court erred in finding that Legacy had no right to exploit the recordings. Legacy
offered two arguments for its position. First, Legacy claimed that the chain of title
passed from WSM to Legacy by way of Leverett and Butrum. However, the court
noted that “[p]ossession of a tangible embodiment of a work or performance such as
the recordings at issue conveys no rights or ownership interests to the intangible
rights embodied therein, especially the right to commercially exploit the
performances embodied therein.” Thus, although Leverett obtained permission
from WSM to take the physical recordings, he did not receive any intangible rights.
Therefore, Leverett had no intangible rights in the recordings to pass to Butrum.
Moreover, Butrum’s copyright for the enhanced recordings he produced did not
include the original acetate recordings. When pre-existing material is altered and a
new copyright is obtained, the copyright applies only to the “derivative work” and
does not extend to the pre-existing material. The subsequent copyright gave Butrum
no interest in the underlying recordings. Therefore, Butrum had no intangible rights
in the original recordings to convey to Legacy.
Next, Legacy argued that it obtained rights to exploit the name and likeness
of Hank Williams because the contract between Williams and WSM was silent on the
issue. Tennessee recognizes the property right of publicity, which acknowledges a
property interest “in the use of one’s name, photograph or likeness.” Further, under
Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-25-1103, this right does not terminate upon
death and is inheritable by the deceased’s heirs. The court refused to infer that
Williams transferred his right of publicity to WSM based on mere silence in the
agreement. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Legacy’s
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claim, holding that Legacy had no interest in the intangible rights attached to the
acetate recordings.
The second issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in finding that
Polygram did not obtain the exclusive right to exploit the recordings as phonograph
records based on the contract between Williams and MGM. The contract consisted
of a letter MGM sent to Williams employing his “exclusive personal services for the
purpose of making phonograph records.” Polygram argued that this letter gave it the
exclusive right to make phonograph records from any recordings, including the
WSM recordings. Polygram relied on the portion of the letter that read, “All
recordings and all records and reproductions made therefrom, together with the
performances embodied therein, shall be entirely our property, free of any claims
whatsoever by you or any person deriving any right or interest from you.” The
court, however, relied on the four corners of the entire document and focused on
the first page that read, “recordings made for the purpose of making phonograph
records.” The disputed recordings were made for the sole purpose of being played
on the radio by WSM when Williams and his band were on the road; they were not
made for the purpose of making phonograph records. Thus, the acetate recordings
were not covered by the contract between MGM and Williams, and neither MGM
nor Polygram had the right to exploit the recordings.
As Polygram illustrates, thorough legal planning and documentation is
essential when dealing with intangible property rights. The interest-holder of
intangible rights should carefully evaluate and properly document all assignment and
licensing decisions because a performer’s legacy and music often survive the artist’s
death. Polygram demonstrates that intangible rights do not necessarily accompany the
transfer of tangible property. These intangible rights are freely assignable and
licensable and do not expire upon death. Thus, when drafting recording contracts,
transactional lawyers should consider the possibility that tangible and intangible
interests may be vested in different persons or entities, and should ensure that the
performer’s publicity rights are held by the intended party.
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
Tennessee Adopts Class Action Tolling Doctrine. Tigg v. Pirelli Tire Corp., No.
M2003-02118-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 812 (Tenn. Ct. App.
December 22, 2005) appeal granted No. M2003-02118-SC-R11-CV, 2006 Tenn.
LEXIS 859 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2006).
By Jonathan W. Robbins
Class action suits are allowed and, in many cases, encouraged, in order to
promote efficiency and economy in litigation where there are a number of
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participants who stand in the same situation. Potential members of such a class must
rely upon the named members to press claims on their behalf. But what happens
when the class action litigation is dismissed, time has passed, and those potential
members are left holding their individual claims? The United States Supreme Court
answered that question over twenty years ago in the Federal context. However,
Tennessee courts had yet to decide the issue until it was presented to the Tennessee
Court of Appeals in Tigg v. Pirelli Tire Corp.
In Tigg v. Pirelli, Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corporation (Pirelli) had hired nonunion replacement workers for its manufacturing plant in Madison, Tennessee while
most of its regular workers, members of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and
Plastic Workers Union, were on strike. When hired, the replacement workers were
told that their jobs would be permanent and they would not be terminated once the
union workers returned. However, after the nine-month strike was settled and union
workers began returning to Pirelli, the company began to fire the replacement
workers under pressure from the national and local unions.
Subsequently, three of the terminated replacement workers filed a class
action suit against Pirelli, the Local 670, and the United Rubber Workers Union.
They sued Pirelli for breach of contract and retaliatory discharge; they sued the
unions for treble damages for procurement of the breach of their employment
contracts. On appeal following the grant of a motion pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P.
12.02(6), the Tennessee Court of Appeals remanded the case of Baldwin v. Pirelli
Armstrong Tire Corp., leaving the breach of contract and procurement of breach of
contract claims to be decided. However, on May 9, 2002, over seven years after the
occurrence of the events leading to the suit, the named plaintiffs dismissed their
complaint, after settling their individual claims, before any attempt to certify the class
was made and without giving notice to the other potential class members.
Three months later, eleven replacement workers filed another class action
suit asserting breach of contract and wrongful termination claims against Pirelli and
the procurement of breach of contract claims against the two unions. Pirelli moved
to dismiss, asserting that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations and
the doctrine of laches. The replacement workers claimed that the statute of
limitations should have been tolled while the Baldwin class action suit was pending
and that they were not guilty of sleeping on their rights. The trial court agreed with
Pirelli and dismissed the complaint as to all parties, citing the expiration of the
relevant statutes of limitations and the doctrine of laches.
On appeal, the workers raised two issues. The first was whether the trial
court erred in rejecting the class action tolling doctrine, which would have tolled the
statute of limitations during the pendency of the Baldwin class action suit. The
United States Supreme Court first articulated the class action tolling doctrine. The
doctrine tolls the statute of limitations for prospective class members who make
timely motions to intervene in the litigation after the court has found the suit
inappropriate for class action status and to potential class members who file their

222

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 8

own individual actions after the class action is not certified. The tolling period
begins when the class action suit is filed and the clock is restarted when the class is
not certified, a class is certified that does not include the individual plaintiff, or when
the individual plaintiff opts out of the class. The class action tolling doctrine
articulated by the United States Supreme Court, nonetheless, is a federal procedural
rule and, while a majority of states addressing the question have incorporated the
doctrine into their own procedures, it was not controlling and Tennessee had not
previously addressed the issue.
Based upon the favorable commentary given to the benefits of the class
action tolling doctrine by the Tennessee Supreme Court in previous cases, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the class action tolling doctrine is consistent
with Tennessee class action rules and creates no conflict with the policies implicit in
statutes of limitations. The court also articulated the four required circumstances
that must be present to invoke the doctrine. Thus, the party seeking the benefit of
the class action tolling doctrine must (1) have been a member of the purported class,
(2) name as the defendant the same defendant in the class action complaint, (3) assert
the same claims originally asserted in the class action suit, and (4) file suit on an
individual basis because the class action tolling doctrine will not apply to subsequent
class action suits. These limitations assure that the named defendant will have
received notice of the claim within the limitations period and will have knowledge, at
least generally, of potential plaintiffs and their claims in order to preserve evidence,
gather witnesses, and otherwise prepare a defense. Therefore, in the Tigg case, the
claim of breach of contract against Pirelli and the claims of procurement of breach
of contract against the unions were not barred by the statute of limitations, but the
separate and distinct claim of wrongful termination against Pirelli was barred.
Also at issue was the trial court’s application of the doctrine of laches.
Laches is a discretionary tool of the courts to dismiss a complaint when there has
been neglect or omission to assert a right for such a time that would cause prejudice
to the adverse party. However, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reiterated the policy
that laches will not be applied where a delay in filing suit can be reasonably explained
or justified. In a case where plaintiffs did not file suit individually while a class action
suit was pending, those potential class action members may not be accused of
sleeping on their rights. Therefore, where the class action tolling doctrine applies,
the doctrine of laches does not apply as long as any subsequent claim is timely filed.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in applying the
doctrine to plaintiff’s claims.
As illustrated in Tigg, the statute of limitations tolling doctrine, as previously
articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States, is compatible with Tennessee
procedural law and will be applied in relevant situations. Additionally, a defendant
will not be able to invoke the doctrine of laches as a means of escaping the class
action tolling doctrine. In practice, when a class action suit is pending, a
transactional lawyer should advise clients of the possibility of future, similar claims if
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the class action is not certified, is certified while excluding some potential members,
or if potential members remove themselves from the class.
___________________
Use of After-Acquired Evidence of Employee Misconduct in Tennessee. Teter
v. Republic Parking Sys., Inc., 181 S.W.3d 330 (Tenn. 2005).
Whitney L. Quarles
Most jurisdictions allow an employer to use evidence of employee
misconduct acquired after an employee's termination to bar or limit the employer's
liability for breach of an employment contract. To excuse an employer's subsequent
breach, an employer must show that it would have immediately terminated the
employee had it known of the misconduct. In Teter v. Republic Parking Systems, Inc.,
the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the required level of proof an employer
must show when it asserts it would have terminated the employee had it known of
the workplace misconduct. The Court held that the “evidence of employee
misconduct . . . need only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence.”
In 1997, two years after he began working as regional vice president for
Republic Parking Systems (“RPS”), Eric Teter renegotiated his employment contract.
The new contract included a severance pay provision allowing Mr. Teter to recover
income for one year if he were “discharged for any reason other than gross
misconduct, fraud, neglect of job responsibilities or voluntary termination.”
Although the 1997 employment contract contained no expiration date, RPS
made several attempts to enter into a new employment contract with Mr. Teter in
2001. Because the proposed contracts contained less-favorable bonus calculations
and included no severance pay provision, Mr. Teter refused to accept the proposed
contracts, as he wished to continue his employment under his 1997 contract. Mr.
Teter received a memorandum in September 2001, notifying him that he was no
longer employed by RPS. The memorandum stated that although Mr. Teter was not
entitled to severance pay because he terminated his employment voluntarily by not
accepting the proposed contracts—a claim the Tennessee Supreme Court later found
erroneous—RPS would provide him severance pay for six months. However, RPS
became suspicious after Mr. Teter removed his computer's central processing unit
from his office, stating that he was removing personal files. An analysis of his
computer revealed that Mr. Teter had been viewing pornographic websites from his
office computer.
RPS’s Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) then sent Mr. Teter a letter stating
that because he had engaged in “gross misconduct” and would have been fired
immediately had the CEO been aware of the activity, Mr. Teter would no longer
receive any severance pay from RPS. Mr. Teter brought suit against RPS in
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November 2001 for breach of contract, seeking severance pay under the 1997
employment contract.
The trial court granted Mr. Teter’s motion for summary judgment, adopting
the reasoning of Lewis v. Fisher Service Co., which required employers to show by clear
and convincing evidence that the employee’s misconduct was so egregious that he or
she would have been fired immediately upon the employer’s discovery of the
misconduct. The trial court found no such clear and convincing evidence, and
therefore, granted summary judgment for Mr. Teter. The Tennessee Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that “the application of the
after-acquired evidence doctrine as a bar to liability presents an issue of first
impression in Tennessee.” The Court agreed with the lower court’s finding that an
employer can use after-acquired evidence of employee wrongdoing to limit or bar its
liability by showing that the employee would have been terminated had the employer
been aware of the misconduct. However, the Court disagreed with the burden of
proof required by the lower court. The court noted that in civil cases, the
requirement of proving the evidence by a clear and convincing standard is reserved
for issues of important public policy. The Court held that after-acquired evidence
cases are not a matter of important public policy and should be treated no differently
from other contract disputes, which utilize the preponderance of the evidence
standard. Because the Court found a material issue of fact as to whether RPS’s CEO
would have fired Mr. Teter had he been aware of the misconduct, the Court
remanded the case for trial.
Teter v. Republic Parking Systems, Inc. represents a decision favorable to
employers. An employer’s obligation under an employment contract can be limited
or barred entirely if an employer can show that an employee's misconduct warranted
immediate dismissal. Because after-acquired evidence of gross misconduct does not
involve a major public policy concern, an employer must only prove certain
immediate termination by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by a clear
and convincing standard. An employer is not charged with the difficult task of
proving with a high probability that it would have immediately terminated the
employee, but instead must simply demonstrate the termination was more probable
than not.
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PROPERTY
Supreme Court Allows Governments to Exercise Eminent Domain Powers
and Transfer the Property to Private Developers. Kelo v. City of New London, 545
U.S. 469 (2005).
By Jason J. Isaacson
Although local governments may use the state’s police powers to condemn
property, this power has constitutional limitations. The Fifth Amendment’s “public
use” restriction allows the government to condemn property and to give it directly to
the public for valid public purposes. However, where the government condemns
property and gives it to private entities for a public purpose, the application of the
Fifth Amendment is less obvious. This tension especially hits home when a citizen’s
property becomes subject to governmental condemnation. Such was the situation
presented to the United States Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London.
In Kelo, the city of New London, Connecticut, via the New London
Development Corporation (“NLDC”), finalized a redevelopment plan to revitalize
the city’s waning economic health. Fortuitously, a pharmaceutical company had
announced plans to build a large research facility adjacent to the Fort Trumball area,
a peninsula that jutted into the Thames River. The plan included, among other
things, the construction of a waterfront hotel, a marina, restaurants, and office space.
Execution of the plan required the procurement of ninety acres of land. Thus, the
city granted the NLDC power to condemn property through eminent domain if
necessary. The NLDC was able to purchase much of the property, but nine property
owners refused to sell. In response, the NLDC initiated condemnation proceedings.
The nine property owners filed suit seeking a restraining order to prevent the
city from condemning the unblighted property. Among other contentions, they
claimed that “the takings would violate the ‘public use’ restriction of the Fifth
Amendment.” While the suit was pending in the New London Superior Court, the
NLDC publicized its intention to lease some of the parcels to private developers to
execute the plan. The trial court granted a restraining order as to the condemnation
of one of the parcels designated in the plan as “marina support,” but denied relief as
to other properties designated as “office space.” Both sides appealed to the Supreme
Court of Connecticut, which held that all of the city’s takings were valid. The
property owners appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States and certiorari
was granted.
In the Supreme Court, the property owners contended that even if the
government properly reimbursed private property owners, it could not do so only to
turn around and transfer it to other private entities. To this end, the petitioners
demanded a literal reading of the words “public use” in the Fifth Amendment.
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Alternatively, they asked the Supreme Court to impose a requirement on legislatures
to show that the public purpose will be served with “reasonable certainty.”
When the Supreme Court first applied the Fifth Amendment to the states in
the late 19th century, they couched the “public use” limitation into a “public
purpose” test. In Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., the Court explained that
“use by the general public” was “inadequate” as a “universal test.” Therefore, in
Justice Stevens’ majority opinion, he rejected the property owners’ literal
interpretation of public use, and instead posited the query of whether the city’s plan
served a “public purpose.”
The meaning of “public purpose” has also evolved over time. In a mid-20th
century case, Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court held that a legislature’s inner-city
redevelopment project served a public purpose as a whole. Thus, the Court
established a narrow role for federal courts in takings cases. Then, in Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff, the Court upheld governmental takings given to private lessees to
weaken a land oligopoly. In that case, the Court established that the state possesses
broad authority to decide what the public goals are and how they will be achieved.
Finally, in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, Co., the Court upheld Congressional provisions to
publicize trade secrets in order to eliminate barriers to competition in the pesticide
market. As a result, legislatures are afforded broad latitude in deciding what
constitutes a valid public purpose. Applying this case law, the Supreme Court
refused to second-guess New London’s redevelopment plan, holding that it satisfied
the “public purpose” requirement of the Fifth Amendment.
Where the government takes property from private individuals and gives it to
other private entities for a valid public purpose, Constitutional demands are satisfied.
Therefore, whether condemned property is then given to private or public entities is
immaterial in takings cases as long as a valid public purpose exists. The applicable
case law forecloses any other reading. Moreover, the Supreme Court also held that
states are not precluded from placing further restrictions on eminent domain.
The dissent capitalized on the government’s role in securing property.
Justice O’Connor warned that all private property is now vulnerable to
condemnation in the name of “economic development.” She surmised that the
losers are the poor and the winners are the rich with political influence. Justice
Thomas emphasized the inability of the government to restore the “subjective value”
of property to its owners under this expansive doctrine. He feared that the most
affected members of society will be minority communities with less political power.
As Kelo illustrates, property owners in the United States must yield to
governmental takings done with a public purpose, whether the property is then given
to private or public entities. Besides adding a new dimension to the issue of whether
private property can be condemned by the government and given to private entities,
Kelo sends a clear message that federal courts will not second-guess legislatures on
this subject. Thus, where governmental condemnation proceedings are in progress,
property owners should use every legislative avenue available to address their
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grievances. Moreover, if state law places further restrictions on eminent domain,
property owners may address their grievances in state courts.
TAXATION
Charitable Tax Exemption for Nonprofit Family Wellness Centers Held
Constitutional in Tennessee. Club Sys. of Tenn. v. YMCA of Middle Tenn., No.
M2004-01966-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 793 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19,
2005).
By Christopher Riccardi
Deciding that real and personal property used to provide physical exercise
opportunities for adults and children without regard to an individual’s ability to pay
constituted a charitable use, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s ruling upholding Tennessee Code Annotated Section 67-5-255 (“Section 675-255”) as constitutional.
Section 67-5-255 was codified in 2000 and, in relevant part, provides a
charitable tax exemption to entities using property for the purpose of a nonprofit
family wellness center in connection with certain organizational requirements
outlined in the statute. Club Systems of Tennessee, Inc. (“Club Systems”) challenged
the constitutionality of Section 67-5-255 in a lawsuit brought against the YMCA of
Middle Tennessee ( “YMCA”) soon after the statute was enacted. The trial court
heard arguments on the matter and upheld the statute as constitutional. Club
Systems appealed this ruling to the Tennessee Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals first considered whether the
statute created a per se property tax exemption by failing to focus upon the
exempted property’s use, thus violating Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee
Constitution. Article II, Section 28 allows the legislature to exempt from property
taxes all property “held and used for purposes purely . . . charitable.” When the
legislature exercises this power under the Tennessee Constitution, the court noted
that the exemption must be based on the use of the property and not the nature of
its owner. Further, the use of the property must be for a purpose that may be
properly exempted under the Tennessee Constitution. Therefore, if the statute
provides a tax exemption for property used “exclusively for” or “directly incidental
to” a charitable purpose, the statute will not run afoul of Article II, Section 28 of the
Tennessee Constitution.
Section 67-5-225 specifically provides a charitable tax exemption for property
used as a nonprofit family wellness center, defined in the statute as “real or personal
property used to provide physical exercise opportunities for children and adults.”
After emphasizing the plain language of the statute, the Tennessee Court of Appeals
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found that the legislature had not overlooked the use requirement embodied in
Tennessee Constitution Article II, Section 28. Further, the court applied Indiana and
Pennsylvania precedent, along with the Tennessee Supreme Court’s definition of
charity, to find that providing a nonprofit family wellness center, operated in
accordance with the statute, is a charitable use of property. Since Section 67-5-255
only exempts property based on its use, specifically property used as a nonprofit
family wellness center which qualifies as a charitable use of property, the court stated
that “the statute does not create a per se exemption . . . that bears no relation to the
property’s actual use.” Accordingly, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that
section 67-5-225 did not violate Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution.
Next, the Tennessee Court of Appeals used equal protection analysis to
determine whether the statute created a property tax exemption for the exclusive
benefit of the YMCA, thus violating the Class Legislation Clause of Article XI,
Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. In its analysis, the court applied Newton v.
Cox and decided that a rational basis standard was appropriate since the legislative
classification at issue did not interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operate to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class. When equal protection
analysis is used under a rational basis standard, the court, quoting Tennessee Small
School Systems v. McWherter, stated that “if some rational basis can be found for the
classification [in the statute] . . . the classification will be upheld.” Consequently, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals held that Section 67-5-225 did not violate Article XI,
Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution because: (1) the “physical fitness of its
citizens is, at least, a legitimate state interest” and (2) “[t]he fact that T.C.A. Section
67-5-225 provides a tax break for . . . place[s] to exercise and . . . learn about the
importance of physical fitness regardless of age, income or ability to pay is . . .
rationally related to the legitimate state interest of healthy citizens.”
Finally, the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether
Section 67-5-255 is constitutional as applied to the YMCA. After concluding that
the statute was enacted to clarify existing law, the court narrowed Club Systems’
unconstitutional as applied argument to “whether the YMCA property is being used
in a ‘purely’ charitable manner as required by the Tennessee Constitution.”
Tennessee precedent calls for a liberal construction of tax exemptions. Therefore,
the court rejected a “very strict construction of the constitutional and statutory
requirement[s].” Further, the court, quoting Youth Programs, Inc. v. Tennessee State
Board of Equalization, noted that “the proper test is whether the challenged use is
‘directly incidental to or an integral part of one of the recognized purposes of an
exempt institution.’” As a result, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the
YMCA’s provision of televisions, sound systems, vending machines, waiting areas,
and parking lots qualified as a charitable use because “these amenities are
. . . an
integral part of the charitable purpose espoused by the YMCA” and “although
incidental to the accomplishment of the YMCA’s charitable function, nonetheless
qualify for tax-exempt status.”
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Club Systems of Tennessee, Inc. v. YMCA of Middle Tennessee affirms the use of
liberal construction of tax exemptions in Tennessee, as well as the “directly
incidental to or an integral part of test” for determining whether property is used for
a purely charitable purpose. Moreover, Club Systems formally adopts the views of
other jurisdictions in concluding that the provision of a nonprofit family wellness
center, as defined in and operated in convention with Section 67-5-255, is a
charitable use of property and may be exempted from property taxes by the
legislature under the Tennessee Constitution.
___________________
When is a Sale a “Wholesale” Sale for Tax Purposes? Pfizer, Inc. v. Johnson, No.
M2004-00041-COA-R3-CV, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23,
2006).
By Nicholas C. Zolkowski
Recently, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that an additional business
tax should not be assessed to all wholesalers, but rather only to wholesalers who are
the most directly related to consumers.
In Tennessee, all transactions are assessed a minimum business tax under
Tennessee Code Annotated Section 67-4-609(a). However, Tennessee Code
Annotated Section 67-4-609(b) requires an additional tax on “wholesale” sales.
Under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 67-4-702(a)(22), a “wholesale” sale
occurs, in the regular course of business, when a wholesaler sells tangible goods to a
retailer for resale, lease, or rental to a user or consumer. Specifically, a wholesaler
sells goods to a retailer, a retailer sells goods to a consumer, and a “wholesale” sale is
the transaction between the wholesaler and a retailer. In such a transaction, the
wholesaler is assessed the additional “wholesale” tax. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Johnson, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals considered the statutory definition of “wholesale” sales
and the associated tax.
Pfizer, Inc. (“Pfizer”) manufactured and sold pharmaceutical drugs as well as
other products. Pfizer sold to both wholesalers, such as McKesson Corporation
(“McKesson”), and retailers. When Pfizer sold products to retailers, it paid the
minimum business taxes and the additional “wholesale” taxes. However, Pfizer paid
only the minimum business taxes—but not the “wholesale” tax—on sales to
McKesson and other wholesalers. Pfizer, Inc. v. Johnson arose following an audit of
Pfizer by the Department of Revenue. The Department categorized Pfizer’s sales to
McKesson as “wholesale” sales, resulting in the assessment of the additional
“wholesale” taxes as well as resulting in delinquency fees against Pfizer in the amount
of $3,495,799.08.
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The trial court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment as to
Pfizer’s liability for the additional taxes and delinquency fees. On appeal, Pfizer
argued that its sales to McKesson were not “wholesale” sales, as defined by the
Tennessee Code Annotated, and thus were not subject to the additional business
taxes.
On appeal, the Court noted that taxing statutes are to be strictly construed
against the government. Moreover, the Court stated that the definition of a
“wholesale” sale was clear, and to interpret it any other way would be impermissibly
extending the language.
The Court looked to the legislative intent behind the statute. The State
argued that the legislature intended to assess the minimum business tax and the
additional “wholesale” tax on all transactions. However, the Court reasoned that this
was not the intent of the legislature when it drafted and enacted the statute. Instead,
the Court held that the legislature intended “wholesale” sales to include only
transactions between wholesalers and retailers. It reasoned that if a buyer purchases
goods, but does not thereafter sell the goods to a consumer, then the buyer is not a
retailer, but another wholesaler. If only wholesalers are party to a sales transaction,
then the additional “wholesale” tax is not intended to be assessed since no retailer is
involved.
The Court held that Pfizer’s sales fit into the non-“wholesale” category.
McKesson did not sell the Pfizer pharmaceuticals to consumers, but rather to
retailers who then sold the pharmaceuticals to consumers. Since McKesson had not
sold the pharmaceuticals directly to consumers, it was a wholesaler and not a retailer.
Pfizer was one step removed from any transaction with a retailer. Therefore, any
sales from Pfizer to McKesson were between wholesalers, and did not meet the
statutory requirement of a “wholesale” sale. Indeed, the statutorily defined
“wholesale” sales occurred later, when McKesson sold the pharmaceuticals to the
retailers. As a result, the Court reversed the trial court’s decision, and held that
Pfizer was not liable for the additional “wholesale” taxes or fines.
The holding of Pfizer, Inc. v. Johnson clarified the definition of “wholesale”
sales in Tennessee, assisting business parties in determining the scope of potential
state tax liabilities. When advising a client concerning sales agreements and potential
“wholesale” taxes, a transactional attorney should remain aware of the client’s and
the other contracting party’s relationships with end consumers. Armed with this
knowledge, the transactional attorney can advise a client regarding the tax
implications—including whether to account for “wholesale” taxes in addition to the
minimum business tax—of the sale of a particular product to an identified buyer.
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TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 Regulates Certain Text
Messages. Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp., 121 P.2d 831 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
By Drew H. Reynolds
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”) was enacted to
regulate the telemarketing industry’s use of sophisticated equipment to generate
automated telephone calls. New advances in technology, however, are continuously
altering society’s understanding of what a telephone call actually is. Short Message
Service (“SMS”), for example, is a service that makes it possible to send and receive
text messages using either a cellular telephone or the Internet. Determining whether
SMS messages should be regulated by acts such as the TCPA is problematic because
the messages do not constitute traditional calls. With technological advances such as
SMS redefining society’s concept of communication, courts now face the dual
challenge of interpreting statutes that regulate communication in the face of
technological innovation and deciding whether such statutes apply to these
innovations. Such was the situation presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in
Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corporation.
In Joffe, Acacia, as part of a marketing campaign, programmed its computers
to send e-mail solicitations over the Internet to consumer e-mail addresses. In
Joffe’s case, Acacia’s computers generated his cellular telephone number, combined
it with his cellular telephone carrier’s domain name, and sent the solicitations to the
resulting e-mail address. When these emails were sent to his carrier’s domain, the
carrier converted their content into a format that could be transmitted to Joffe’s
cellular telephone number. Consequently, Joffe filed a complaint alleging that Acacia
had violated the TCPA by sending unsolicited advertisements to his cellular
telephone in the form of text messages. Acacia moved twice for summary judgment,
but both motions were denied and the trial court held that Acacia had violated the
TCPA.
On appeal, Acacia raised several issues. The first was whether the superior
court erred in ruling that the TCPA applied to Acacia’s actions. This issue can be
further divided into two smaller issues: first, whether Acacia called Joffe and, second,
whether it used an automatic dialing system to do so. Although the TCPA prohibits
making “any call” using “any automatic dialing system” to “any telephone number
assigned to a . . . cellular telephone service,” it does not define the word “call.” In
order to determine what Congress intended when it used the word “call,” the
appellate court applied customary rules of statutory interpretation, considering both
the plain and ordinary meanings of the word “call” and the purpose of the statute
itself. Because the TCPA was enacted to control automated telephone calls, the
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court found that Congress used the word “call” to refer to an attempt to
communicate by telephone.
Furthermore, the court found that the potential for two-way real time voice
communication, which Acacia argued was an essential component of a call, was
irrelevant. Because the TCPA prohibits the act of attempting to communicate with a
cellular telephone number using certain equipment—regardless of whether there is a
possibility of vocal communication between the parties—the court held that a text
message may constitute a call subject to the requirements of the TCPA if the other
requirements of the statute are met. The court also rejected Acacia’s argument that it
merely sent an e-mail to an e-mail address. Although Acacia used the Internet to
send the messages and sent them to an e-mail address, they were meant to reach
Joffe’s carrier, where they would be converted into SMS messages, and thus should
not be considered e-mail. Because sending a text message from the Internet to a
phone achieves the same result as sending it from a phone to another phone,
Acacia’s Internet-to-phone messages functioned as attempts to communicate with
Joffe by telephone. Consequently, the court held that Acacia called Joffe.
The TCPA, however, only applies to calls made using an automated
telephone dialing system, which it defines as “equipment which has the capacity--(A)
to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential
number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” Acacia asserted that it did not use
such equipment, again arguing that it simply used its computers to send e-mail to an
e-mail address. Yet, the court found that the definition of automated dialing system
includes advances in technology; thus, the fact that Acacia used technology different
from that contemplated by Congress when it enacted the TCPA was irrelevant. By
utilizing its computers, along with SMS technology, Acacia effectively used an
automatic telephone dialing system to call a telephone number assigned to a cellular
telephone and, in so doing, violated the TCPA.
Acacia finally argued that the TCPA violated its rights under the First
Amendment. A statute that creates a content-neutral time, place, and manner
restriction on speech survives Constitutional challenge if it serves “a significant
government interest,” “is narrowly tailored” to serve that interest, and leaves “open
ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” Acacia argued
that Congress did not articulate any governmental interest applicable to its actions
because it could not have anticipated the existence of SMS technology when it
enacted the TCPA. The court found, however, that protecting the privacy of cellular
telephone subscribers, many of whom have completely replaced their “land line”
telephones with cellular telephones, serves a significant government interest.
Furthermore, because the TCPA prohibits only those calls made with automatic
dialing systems, it is narrowly tailored to serve the government’s interest and leaves
ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Consequently,
the court held that the TCPA did not violate Acacia’s rights under the First
Amendment.
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As Joffe illustrates, the TCPA applies to any attempt to communicate with a
cellular telephone number using certain equipment. Joffe suggests that businesses will
not be able to circumvent the TCPA simply by utilizing new technology, such as
SMS, that did not exist when the TCPA was enacted. The TCPA, however, does not
completely prevent businesses from communicating with consumers; businesses still
have the option of entering calls by hand or making only those calls that consumers
have consented to receive. Consequently, to assist clients in avoiding potential
liability under the TCPA, an attorney should advise clients to use alternative, legal
methods of communication instead of trying to avoid the provisions of the TCPA by
utilizing advances in technology.

